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The euro crisis has been extensively discussed in terms 
of  economics,  finance,  political  intrigues,  and  European 
institutions, but a key aspect—the political economy of 
the  crisis—has  received  little  attention.  Politicians  and 
social  scientists  from  emerging  economies,  especially 
Eastern Europe, look with amazement at this oversight. 
Europeans need to absorb and apply the lessons of the 
substantial literature available on the topic of the political 
economy  of  crisis  resolution.  An  excellent  overview  is 
provided  in  The  Political  Economy  of  Policy  Reform,  a 
book edited by my colleague John Williamson in 1994. He 
wrote  a  useful  summary  himself,  and  Jeffrey  Sachs 
provided  one  of  the  sharpest  contributions  in  his 
discussion  of  reform  in  Poland  and  Russia.  This  article 
focuses on how anti-crisis policy should be made, not on 
its  content.  It  proposes  twelve  principles  for  the 
resolution of an economic crisis. 
First, policymakers must realize that a crisis has erupted 
and  that this  implies a  radical  departure  from  ordinary 
politics. In a serious crisis, the old economic system has to 
change fundamentally. But in the euro crisis, the French 
and  German  leaders  refuse  to  acknowledge  this 
elementary  fact.  Germans  invoke  their  concept  of 
Ordnungspolitik, meaning that everything has to be built 
slowly  and  organically,  which  is  the  opposite  of  crisis 
resolution.  Yet  the  father  of  the  German  economic 
miracle, Ludwig Erhard, carried out currency reform and 
deregulation in one big package in 1948, which explains 
its success. The French habitually proclaim that “Europe 
does not do shock and awe,” with implicit reference to 
the  Iraq  war,  thereby  surrendering  to  the  idea  that 
Europe cannot solve the crisis. 
Second,  crisis  resolution  almost  always  requires  new 
leadership.  Granted,  changing  the  leadership  of  a 
continent  with  disparate  and  democratically  elected 
governments is harder than in a single country plunged 
into  turmoil.  But  the  leaders  who  have  led  an  entire 
region into a crisis are not likely to be able to carry out 
  
the radical changes needed to salvage the nation and 
undo  previous  failed  policies.  The  search  for  a  new 
leader  is  often  an  iterative  process.  The  greater  the 
political instability, the faster an adequate leader can be 
found.  The  three  eastern  EU  members  with  recent 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs—Hungary, 
Latvia,  and  Romania—all  changed  governments  twice 
during their crises. After elections brought them new 
governments, the economies in Ireland and Portugal are 
looking  better.  Europe  is  happy  to  see  new 
governments  finally  emerging  in  Greece,  Italy,  and 
Spain.  The  change  of  guard  in  the  European  Central 
Bank (ECB) may also be positive. But President Nicolas 
Sarkozy  of  France  and  Chancellor  Angela  Merkel  of 
Germany remain the dominant European leaders. Since 
they have assumed the most power in the region, they 
are primarily responsible for the many failed attempts 
at resolving the euro crisis. Failed leaders do not solve 
crises.  Therefore,  it  is  doubtful  whether  Europe  can 
recover before France and Germany elect new leaders.  
Third,  crisis  resolution  calls  for  new  thinking  and 
requires new, clear principles. Ordinary politicians are 
usually good at horse trading and compromises, but for 
crisis  resolution,  the  opposite—namely  visionary 
leadership—is needed. Reform in Latin America and in 
Eastern Europe after communism brought a new group 
of  outsiders  to  the  fore,  most  of  them  economists. 
Europe needs such leaders as well. Mario Draghi at the 
ECB, Lucas Padademos in Athens, and Mario Monti in 
Rome  might  make  the  cut,  but  Europe  needs  to  go 
outside the circle of old politicians stuck in the failed 
political molds. 
Fourth, crisis leaders must focus on key concerns and 
not get distracted by peripheral issues, wasting policy 
focus  and  causing  unnecessary  strife.  An  outstanding 
example  of  an  irrelevant  issue  is  the  current  French-
German  campaign  for  a  tax  on  financial  transactions 
(the  so-called  Tobin  tax,  named  after  the  economist 
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James  Tobin).  Such  a  tax  is  probably  ineffective  and 
harmful, as the Swedish example from 1983–91 showed, 
but more importantly it would do nothing to resolve the 
financial  crisis.  Even  now,  key  politicians  appear  to  be 
focused on increasing their power rather than on solving 
the  crisis.  A  case  in  point  is  the  German  and  French 
preoccupation with weakening the European Commission, 
although they are not preparing any sensible anti-crisis 
programs themselves. 
Fifth, economics must be given primacy over law and 
constitutions,  which  was  self-evident  for  reformers  in 
emerging economies. This explains why economists and 
not lawyers have led successful crisis governments. This 
principle  does  not  apply  actions  that  are  illegal  or 
unconstitutional.  Crises  are  times  when  laws  and 
constitutions are changed to set up new institutions and 
reform  the  old ones.  In  particular  many  Germans  have 
problems with absorbing this insight, taking institutions as 
given or even holy, notably their own Constitution, the 
Treaty on the European Union, and the mandate of the 
ECB. Even so, they have just added a fiscal responsibility 
requirement  to  their  constitution.  For  crises  to  be 
resolved,  legal,  national,  or  cultural  obstacles  must  be 
overcome. EU institutions need to be strengthened and 
adjusted to be made viable.  
Sixth,  a  comprehensive  program  for  crisis  resolution 
and reform must be worked out as soon as possible after 
a  new  government  has  been  formed.  It  must  be 
consistent and credible. It should not be too large, but it 
should  contain  all  essential  policies.  Typically,  such  a 
program should be presented within one month of the 
formation of a new government.  
Seventh, no consensus is possible in a severe crisis. As 
Sachs put it: “In deep crises, there simply is no consensus 
to build upon, only confusion, anxiety and a cacophony of 
conflicting  opinions.”  Serious  reformers  are  always 
controversial. Since consensus is impossible, it is a waste 
of time to seek it. The vested interests of the old elites are 
nearly always the root of the problem. They will suffer 
from reforms, and they will not take their loss lying down 
but instead will deploy the media in opposition to reform. 
As  Williamson  observed,  reformers  need  “the  will  and 
ability to appeal directly to the public and bypass vested 
interests.”  Since  the  main  problem  is  the  old  elite, 
democracy should not be seen as an obstacle but as the 
best means to beat them. In two parliamentary elections 
in Latvia during the crisis resolution period, the oligarchic 
parties  that  ruled  that  country  for  two  decades  were 
defeated. 
 
Eighth, transparency is vital. Crises breed rumors and 
suspicion.  The  new  government  must  encounter  this 
problem with maximum openness and reach out to the 
public over the heads of the old elite. Therefore, the 
government program must be clear and readable. The 
new reform ministers need to go out to the public and 
the  media  and  explain  their  policies  over  and  over 
again. 
Ninth,  international  support  is  crucial.  The  key 
international  financial  institution  is  the  IMF.  It  has 
several vital properties. It is technocratic and the bearer 
of  a  limited  number  of  key  principles  for 
macroeconomic  stability.  It  has  a  strong  professional 
staff and well-tested procedures for the swift resolution 
of  a  financial  crisis  and  for  review  of  the  process  of 
healing. Moreover, the IMF can rapidly deliver a large 
amount of financing without any legislative decisions. 
Tenth, a crisis program must be sufficiently financed, 
otherwise it is likely to fail. As former Treasury Secretary 
Lawrence  Summers  wrote  in  the  Financial  Times  on 
November 3, “program announcements that are vague 
and  try  to  purchase  stability  on  the  cheap  are  more 
likely  to  exacerbate  problems  than  to  resolve  them.” 
That is true of all the European Union’s half a dozen 
“comprehensive” crisis programs to date. Its ultimate 
mistake  was  to  resort  to  financial  engineering  with 
dubious  leverage  without  credibility,  as  it  did  on 
October  27  and  December  9.  Such  measures  do  not 
arouse  trust  but  distrust.  Tragically,  the  current 
European leaders seem to lack an ability to learn from 
their repeated mistakes, and their populations are not 
wise or vigorous enough to throw them out. 
Eleventh,  the  anti-crisis  program  must  be 
implemented  early  and  decisively,  when  a  new 
government enjoys a honeymoon or what the former 
central  bank  chairman  of  Poland,  Leszek  Balcerowicz, 
has  called  a  short  period  of  “extraordinary  politics” 
when the public accepts exceptionally radical reforms. It 
is better to be fast than perfect but late. The measures 
should be as front-loaded as possible. When the three 
Baltic  countries  launched  their  crisis  programs,  they 
carried out fiscal adjustments of 9 to 10 percent of GDP 
in early 2009, and virtually all indicators bottomed out 
during the first half of 2009. While Latvia carried out 60 
percent  of  its  needed  adjustment  in  the  first  year, 
Greece  carried  out  less  than  30  percent  and  seems 
condemned  to  many  years  of  declining  output.  The 
front-loaded  Baltic  anti-crisis  programs  encountered 
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 minimal social resistance, whereas the slow, delayed, and 
insufficient Greek measures unleashed massive protests. 
Early and decisive action makes economies hit the bottom 
early on and breeds confidence and credibility. To quote 
Summers:  “Where  policy  has  succeeded…it  has  been 
based on clear actions exceeding the minimum necessary 
to stabilize the situation.” 
Finally,  successful,  early  fiscal  reforms  have  several 
qualitative  hallmarks.  Expenditure  cuts  must  dominate 
over tax hikes because expenditures can be reduced much 
faster than revenues can be raised, and people do not 
appreciate  tax  hikes  when  they  receive  fewer  public 
services and transfers. Characteristically, expenditure cuts 
comprised three-quarters of the radical fiscal adjustment 
of  the  Baltic  countries  in  2009.  Large  expenditure 
reductions have to be selective, which makes them drive 
structural  reform,  slashing  red  tape  and  facilitating 
growth.  Austerity  must  be  perceived  as  reasonably 
equitable.  Excise  taxes  on  luxury  goods  and  property 
taxes  are  suitable  levers  on  the  rich,  while  higher 
progressive income taxes are not very effective since the 
very rich often are registered as living abroad. Public wage 
cuts should be greater for those with higher salaries, and 
social safety nets need to be maintained. 
This is the received wisdom of the literature of political 
economy  of  crisis  resolution.  None  of  these  insights  is 
original,  but  the  current  European  leaders  have  largely 
proven  immune  to  these  elementary  observations.  The 
euro  crisis  is  an  illustrative  collection  of  mistakes  of 
political economy. It took the European leaders several 
months  before  they  accepted  professional  advice  from 
the IMF. Few rulers in the developing world are that daft. 
Several  unsuccessful  political  leaders  have  fortunately 
departed, but the two key players, Sarkozy and Merkel, 
persist. Since they have assumed most of the power in the 
European Union during the crisis, the main responsibility 
for this astounding disaster falls on them. As Sachs noted 
in the Financial Times on November 7, “Europe hangs on 
the  words  of  Chancellor  Angela  Merkel,  which  are 
sporadic  and  often  doled  out  on  the  eve  of  eurozone 
summits.” After almost two years of crisis, neither Greece 
nor Italy has any plausible anti-crisis programs. The latest 
Italian “austerity” budget without any cuts is nothing but 
a bad joke. And the European Union is about to run out of 
credible  sources of  financing  after  its many  failed anti-
crisis programs. This folly has apparently driven Europe 
into an unnecessary recession. 
 
 
Given the miserable performance of the current set of 
political leaders, they have lost all credibility. There is 
little reason to believe that they will be able to resolve 
the crisis. This is not a moral or political statement, but 
an  assessment  based  on  rather  elementary  political 
economy.  In  the  end,  crisis  resolution  is  a  matter  of 
restoring confidence in the state. For that task, Europe 
needs new leaders, who can handle a crisis in a relevant 
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